

Politics, Solidarity, and the (Dis)Location of Love

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“We have to build organizations that are democratic, multiracial, and militant, with a foundation in solidarity...“Solidarity” meaning that even if you don’t experience a particular oppression, it doesn’t matter, because you understand that as ordinary people, our fates are tied together, and that one group’s liberation is dependent upon the liberation of all the oppressed and exploited.” – Keeayanga-Yamahtta Taylor¹

“In the airports, we have formed our itinerary. Begin with the joy of disobedience, the love of the stranger, and the hope for the new. Move onward to class hatred and the science of structural analysis. Continue to travel, never satisfied, to arrive at the power that is constituted by organization.” –Asad Haider²

Much of what I write here takes place between the differing (yet similar) comments above. Both of the texts from which these comments are pulled were written recently, in the context of the ascendancy of what many (myself included) see as a white supremacist, xenophobic, sexist, and quasi-fascist presidential administration of Donald Trump in the United States. These words were written not only in this context, but also in the context of a budding resistance movement that has seen historic numbers of people take to the streets (and the airports) in protest of this rightward leap which, to us, seems so abrupt even though it is situated within an ever right-drifting political scene in this country.

These recent rounds of protest should also be put in the context of a longer running set of left movements reaching through the young, yet powerful, Black Lives Matter movement, the even younger movement to shut down the Dakota Access Pipeline in North Dakota led by a historic coalition of Native American tribes and

their supporters, back to the Occupy Wall Street movement which began in 2011, along with other recent left oriented movements around the world.

Though it is the context of these movements that are the occasion for my reflections here, this context, and the reflections that follow are also connected to a larger, more philosophical set of questions about the nature and role of emotion in political thought and action. Specifically, I am interested in thinking through the relations between love and the political and the ways in which love and a more standard concept in political movements, namely the concept of solidarity, may or may not intersect in political action and movements.

It is for this reason that I begin with the above quotations from the current political moment. What they nicely demonstrate is that such political action can be read in different ways; some looking to emotional or affective states as foundation for political action and organization as in the Haider quotation where ‘joy’ and ‘love’ are read as that which emerge in the occupation of U.S. airports. Haider reads these emotions as then forming the foundation upon which a larger movement might be built. Other readings of political action, like that given by Taylor, think in less emotional terms and rather in terms of solidarity; a coming together of people around a common political goal who have no—or need to have no—emotional or affective connection in order to build larger movements.

This type of solidarity, the kind that we can following Sally Sholz and others, call ‘political solidarity’ is a “project related” solidarity in which individuals come together to work on political projects which seek to change unjust social structures and end forms of oppression.³ The concept of ‘political solidarity’ recognizes that

people working in these social movements/projects may have differing motivations (indignation, a moral commitment to justice, anger at certain events, etc...), differing levels of commitment to the cause (some may be out in the streets all the time, others may only go to structured meetings or provide material support for the movement, still others come and go, etc) and differing ideas about how to achieve the goals of the project (some of which can be conflictual). From this perspective then, it is the goal itself that orients their work not the emotional states of the actors.

Hannah Arendt takes up this view in *On Revolution* when she argues against a politics based on emotion and in favor of one based on solidarity. Here Arendt claims that “solidarity is a principle that can inspire and guide actions” whereas emotion, or the ‘passions’ in her parlance, cannot do this properly because, she argues, emotional states are fleeting and too impermanent to be relied on to help construct and reconstruct social and political institutions.⁴ In a more recent example, historian Eric Foner, takes up a similar view, arguing that:

This is a pseudo-politics, a psycho-politics that says people ought to be loving each other. That is not what politics is, people loving each other. It’s people acting together, even if they don’t love each other, for a common cause. If you are going out to a labor picket line, are they all loving each other, the people on that picket line? Probably not but they have a common interest that they are pursuing.⁵

I offer these brief examples as a means to show that there is in fact a theoretical division to be had between the concepts of solidarity and love in the political. I will

return to this favoring of solidarity and critique of love as a basis for politics below, but I want now to think more about the ways particular conceptions of love might ground a politics.

I. Two Ways of Loving in the Political

Two ways of thinking love in the political I would like to explore here are first, the idea—as opposed to Foner’s and Arendt’s claims above—that a certain type of love could (and maybe should) form the foundation of an emancipatory or revolutionary politics and political movements. And second, the idea that a political notion of love can be the outcome of, or emerge in such a politics and it is this emergence that can come to condition further action. There is a connection between these two forms or concepts of love in the political but there are also differences. I will say a bit about each of these in turn.

Love as Foundation

Lets first look at a few examples of the former conception of the role of love in politics (that of love as a grounding or foundational force). Both Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, (while certainly noting some of the limitations of love as a political concept) have argued in favor of a particular type of love in this way, as a political category in line with a certain type of communist politics. As they both point out in different ways, under a properly conceived and executed communism, there would be no social/class difference and hence no divide amongst individuals and so one’s ‘love’ can extend to all in ways that it simply does not under a class-divided society

such as the one we experience today. In this way, a universalist political conception of love becomes possible in the wake of the revolution.⁶

At the same time, such a love can also be a force that conditions revolutionary activity insofar as individuals and groups can shed themselves of attachments to class and other divisions via a recognition of universality that can be the result of a kind of evental moment. We can think here, for instance, of Badiou's championing of Saint Paul as exemplar of just this kind of turn toward universal love- at the moment of his transformation, he no longer recognizes the old class distinctions in his society (Jews, Greeks, Christians, etc) and all individuals become equally God's children, and equally loved.⁷

The kind of love we have in mind here is the kind that Eric Fromm describes when elaborating the notion of 'brotherly love' in which one's conception of themselves as separate from all others is overcome and wherein, as Fromm puts it, one experiences "a sense of responsibility, care, respect, knowledge for any other human being [and a] wish to further his life."⁸ Fromm argues that any ability to love (whether it be love of self, of particular individuals, or humanity as such) requires the concepts elaborated in the quote above, namely that of responsibility, care, respect, and knowledge. It is easy, I think, to see how these further concepts ground love in a variety of ways as to truly feel love for another person requires these things.⁹

To be sure, this form of love is an achievement according to Fromm- it is not something that we automatically feel. And not only is this kind of love not automatic, to extend this to the entirety of humanity in the form of 'brotherly love' is truly

difficult given the way modern society pushes against this. As Fromm points out here, our social world is not organized in such a way as to promote the achievement of this love and in fact it actively works against it insofar as capitalism structures our existence around commodities, work, and competition. Žižek, in commenting on this in relation to a Pauline universal love, writes that such a love is “love within the confines of the Law, love as the struggle to suppress the excess of sin generated by the Law.”¹⁰ The ‘Law’ cited by Žižek here is precisely the law of the social, the law organized in a way that interpellates subjects not as comrades in existence, but competitors. So in this way, such a love is, as Žižek goes on to put it, “the modest dispensing of spontaneous goodness.”¹¹

Returning to Fromm with this in mind, he writes that it is “only in the love of those who do not serve a purpose [that] love begins to unfold” in its most authentic modality.¹² Not surprisingly, as with Badiou and Žižek, Fromm identifies examples of teachings in relation to this type of universalist love in religious traditions, such as Christianity and Judaism and it is from these traditions that Fromm draws when elaborating the conception here.

Micheal Hardt and Toni Negri also make the concept of love in politics a centerpiece of their understanding of a properly oriented political project in 2004’s *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire*, arguing that:

People today seem unable to understand love as a political concept, but a concept of love is just what we need in order to grasp the constituent power of the multitude. Love has become a strictly private affair. We need a more generous and a more unrestrained conception of love. We need to recuperate

the public and political conception of love common to the pre-modern traditions. Christianity and Judaism, for example, both conceive of love as a political act that constructs the multitude.¹³

Here again we see a reference to the religious as the location from which such a notion of love can emerge. As is well known, ‘multitude’ is Hardt and Negri’s term of art for a potentially revolutionary subjectivity emerging as a result of the globalized form of capitalist relations that exist in the current moment, a political assemblage that presents the possibility of a truly democratic emancipation from the oppressive forces that exist within our globalized capitalist order.

Though we cannot fully flesh out this concept of the “multitude” here (as this is beyond and outside the project of this chapter), suffice it to say that as Hardt and Negri understand it, the multitude is not that of a social class who’s shared status might bind them together as in, for instance, Marx’s conception of the alienated proletariat.¹⁴ Though the multitude is not a social class in this classical sense, it is, as Hardt and Negri point out “a class concept” insofar as it does mark differences in social positioning based on sets of social markers.¹⁵ The difference here is one in which differing social and political markers (such as race, gender, sexual orientation, economic status, etc.) are preserved in the multitude rather than negated by one unifying concept or marker (such as ‘wage laborer’). In this way, the multitude, as they argue:

...remains plural and multiple...the multitude is composed of a set of singularities—and by singularity here, we mean a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, a difference that remains

different... The multitude, although it remains multiple and internally different is able to act in common and thus rule itself.¹⁶

This differing and differential multitude forms a 'singularity', acts to produce a 'common', and rules itself when it comes together in a way that creates a political unity-in-difference, or an oppositional force which seeks the resistance to, and destruction of oppressive politics and institutions. This is what Hardt and Negri refer to as the multitude's 'constituent power' it can, through linkages formed across difference create a commonality between different sets of actors in different circumstances in such a way as to bring about a new possibility, a new 'human nature' that links these disparate groups into a singularity that can allow for cooperation.¹⁷

As an example of such a constituent power we might think of the linkage that was formed between protesters in Ferguson who, in 2014 were under attack by militarized police forces for protesting the murder of Mike Brown by police officer Darren Wilson and Palestinian activists who face similar (yet different) attacks in Gaza as the result of a similar (yet again, different) historical situation.

When video of those protesters in Ferguson being tear-gassed was uploaded to the internet via social media, Palestinian activists began tweeting back instructions for treating those who had been the victims of the gas attacks and also tactics for making it difficult for police to launch those attacks.¹⁸ In that moment a new singularity was born- a unity in difference which opened up the space for a new common, and a new political subjectivity. This moment led to further linkages between the Palestinians in the occupied territories and Black Lives Matter where in

2015, a delegation of Black Lives Matter activists went to Gaza to learn from and take part in the struggle there and this linkage continues as I write these words.¹⁹ It is here that Hardt and Negri see a connection to a political conception of love.

Constituent power, they write,

...is a decision that arises out of the ontological and social processes of productive labor; it is an institutional form that develops a common content; it is a deployment of force that defends the historical progression of emancipation and liberation; it is in short, an act of love.²⁰

It is this then that leads them to call for a reinvention of the political concept of love. As Hardt and Negri claim here, underneath the constituent power of the multitude as they understand it, there lies a work of love that is what emerges in these moments of the production as a new sense of the common out of singularities like the one that I describe above. Here is the call:

We need to recover today this material and political sense of love, a love as strong as death. This does not mean that you cannot love your spouse, your mother, and your child. It only means that your love does not end there, that love serves as the basis for our political projects in common and the construction of a new society. Without this love, we are nothing.²¹

To be sure, in making this turn to a call for such a reinvention of a political form of love, which is also the kind of universalist love that Fromm describes above, Hardt and Negri are moving from describing to prescribing- their theory of the multitude up to this point has been an attempt to capture the emergence of the phenomena of assembled singularities. This prescription of a public and universalist

conception of love for Hardt and Negri then, is a modality of attempting to unite this amorphous assemblage in such a way as to form a political subject capable of ending oppression. But this is also an attempt at doing so intentionally and not merely watching such projects of political love emerge as a result of contingent historical circumstance and event. Now that we have a picture of the first kind of politics of love, that of a universalist foundation in love for a revolutionary politics, as exemplified in our readings of Hardt and Negri, Badiou, Žižek, and Fromm, I want to turn to the other connection between love and the political mentioned above, that of love as emergent rather than ground, and say a bit more about it as well and then we can turn to the idea of solidarity and its role.

Love as Emergent

It is not hard to see how a feeling of love might emerge in the midst of political action. We can already see shades of this at work in the more descriptive part of Hardt and Negri's project insofar as they themselves speak of the emergence of singularities out of difference; certainly one can imagine such singularities giving rise to a kind of love in the midst of the coming together of people in political actions and political movements. And there are many accounts of this process to draw from, not the least of which is, again, the first portion of the quote from Haider that frames this chapter, where love is found in the occupation of the airport. But the question is, how does such an emotion attach to political action?

Deborah Gould in her work on the history of the U.S. gay rights and anti-Aids activist organization ACT UP provides a nice account of how, in general, emotion

emerges in, is connected to, and can be redirected by political movements.²² She refers to this as the 'emotional work' of political movements and organizations. In describing this emotional work she argues that, "movement contexts are sites where inchoately felt affective states get translated into named emotions, guiding the indeterminate potential of bodily intensities in directions that tend to align with the movement's goals."²³ It is in the 'emotion work' of an action or organization that affective states become clarified and understood in a new way, opening a new potential (in a similar vein to that described by Hardt and Negri) for a new site of the common and a new political subjectivity. Here again is Gould speaking more directly about how ACT UP's emotional work constructed new modes of subjectivity and social relations in LGBTQ communities and their accomplices:

ACT UP's emotional pedagogy offered new ways for queer folks to feel about themselves, about dominant society, and about political possibilities amid the AIDS crisis, offering a 'resolution' of sorts to lesbian and gay ambivalence: it emphasized self-love, and self-respect over shame and self doubt, authorized antagonism toward society, eased fear of social rejection, and challenged the desire for acceptance on straight society's terms. (215)

As Gould goes on to point out, one of the other key products of the emotional work of ACT UP is that, through specific actions, emotions were not only named, but also transformed. Gould describes at length how grief was transformed into anger in actions such as the "political funerals," the first of which was a march on Washington, where people carried the ashes of their loved ones to the gates of the White House and spread those ashes on the Whitehouse lawn.²⁴

In this and other such 'political funerals', ACT UP transformed the gay and lesbian community's relationship to their grief at the loss of loved ones and friends. As Gould points out, referring to multiple accounts by members of ACT UP organizations around the country, grief began to be experienced as anger- anger at the institutions that cared little for the communities that were hit the hardest by the epidemic, anger at the larger society's bigotry toward these communities, and anger at the government who did nothing to stem the violence of the disease in these communities. Here Gould writes that:

AIDS activists' repeated naming of their grief as anger effectively and *affectively* altered how some queer folks were actually feeling. Like other feeling states, grief is a complicated matrix of sentiments that includes sadness, loss, depression, fear, anger, dread, and a host of others. Activists altered the meaning and experience of grief by renaming as "anger" that complicated constellation of feelings.²⁵

Now of course this emotional work done by the movement in transforming grief into anger, and anger into action, is not the emotional work of love but this example provides both a nice theoretical and a nice empirical accounting of how movements produce, translate, and transform emotions as such. It is not hard to see how movements can also produce and transform love in the midst of their activities. It seems to me that, to return to Hardt and Negri for a moment, this is exactly the kind of thing that are getting at when in their descriptive account, they refer to the constituent power of the expression of a singularity in a multitude as an 'act of love.' The coming together of a movement can have the effect of producing love in the

work that the movement engages in. It can do so through the production of a singularity- or a site within which such love can emerge and be named as such. Such sites can in this way, become what Feminist philosopher Maria Lugones has called 'worlds.'²⁶

As Lugones describes her concept of a world, it is a shared space inhabited by people who identify with (or identified by) the structures, norms, and institutions that exist in that world. Worlds as she argues can be big; like whole societies, or they can be small, containing just a few people.²⁷ Worlds can be friendly to inhabitants or they can be hostile- they can construct individuals in a way that makes them the objects of oppression and exclusion or they can offer freedom and a sense of agency.²⁸ To find oneself 'at ease' in a given world is to recognize its structures and norms as one's own, to recognize the others that inhabit that world as akin to one, to be 'bonded' to others in that world, to experience confidence and happiness in that world, in other words, to love others and that world itself.²⁹

Thinking about Lugones' conception of a 'world' in the context of a movement's opening of a site in which a multitude comes together in a new way, we can see such a singularity as a world in this way. Such a world has the constituent power of creating new subjectivities that can then become 'at ease' in the world of the movement. And in this, the individuals who come to inhabit such a world, can come to experience love for the others involved, and for the movement's world itself.

Here again, as we saw in Gould's example of ACT UP, we see how the emotional work of a movement can generate and name emotional states that are

emergent in the work of the movement itself. These states are then the result of a kind of habituation of emotion via the work of the movement's world in which a new social bond is created. Such habituation happens through a variety of means as we have already seen. It happens in actions such as marches like the political funerals of ACT UP, in spontaneous protest actions such those that happened in Ferguson, in the more recent occupation of airports in the U.S., the tent cities of Occupy, or the encampment at Standing Rock. This habituation of emotion is brought about through a movement's sloganeering, march chants, in the organizational meetings, and other ritualized forms of practice that undergird the emotional work that a movement engages in. Speaking of this kind of habituation of affect into named emotion, Sarah Ahmed writes that,

This is why the social bond is always rather sensational. Groups cohere around a shared orientation toward some things as being good, treating some things and not others as the cause of delight. If the same objects make us happy—or if we invest in the same objects as being what should make us happy—then we would be orientated or directed in the same way.³⁰

Such happiness is tied then to an experience of love, as Ahmed continues, “the experience of delight involves a loving orientation toward the object, just as the experience of love registers what is delightful.”³¹

Though Ahmed is not talking about political movements as objects of delight here, we can see how this applies. Putting together Ahmed's claims with the concept of a 'world' and one's ease in that world drawn from Lugones, we can see how I might experience myself at ease in the world of a political movement when it

provokes in me a feeling of love for both others in that world and that world itself along with the goals that such a world seeks to bring about in its existence. When the movement's actions and other forms of practice work to habituate me, and I habituate myself in them in such a way as I see myself reflected in the movement I can come to delight in the work in such a way that my feeling of love for those involved in the movement and its goals registers my delight in being a part of the movement. But to be clear, from this perspective, the emotion is product, not foundation. And it is singular, particular, and contingent on the work of the movement itself. Such political emotion is not universal.

It is true that, as Haider says again returning to the quote from the start of this chapter, some participants in the airport occupations could experience the emotions of joy and love, but it is not necessary that all did, nor would it be proper to say that such emotions can pre-exist the emotional work of a movement or an action in such a way as to serve as a foundation for such work.³² It is here that the idea of political solidarity makes an insistent return. It seems that what is needed first and foremost in any political movement or action is a sense of political solidarity that brings people together which then can become a catalyst for emotional work which might produce a political love. But here again, there is a kind of *particularity* to politics (rather than a universality)- one works in solidarity with others that are of like mind insofar as they wish to achieve the same end, and if one comes to feel love as a result of such political action, it is not a universal love, but rather as I just argued above, particular love, a love for the movement, those whom you struggle alongside, and a love for the movement's goals.

II. Solidarity as Foundational

I think Simone De Beauvoir is helpful here in further marking the distinction between the concepts of a universal, foundational political love and the concept of solidarity (and any attendant political emotions that might emerge in context). In her early essay *Pyrrhus and Cineas* Beauvoir argues that universalist and foundational political concepts of love are far too abstract to ground any real political project.³³ For De Beauvoir, this is in part because of the relations between self and other are such that the self only comes to understand itself as the particular kind of being that it is (a being that exists in this particular place, at this particular time, that has these particular characteristics, beliefs, goals, etc) in its relations with others. Here De Beauvoir writes, "In projecting himself into the world, a man situates himself by situating other men around him."³⁴ I come to know who I am, to construct my sense of my world and my projects insofar as I both differentiate myself from some others and see myself (or who and what I want to be) in some *other* others. Individual selves are thus, in this way, certainly bound in their selfhood to their relations with others and the structures that are created through those relations in a given time and place. We can I think, see the affinities between this understanding of the relations between the self and the social and that offered by Lugones. I inhabit a world, and understand myself as an inhabitant of that world insofar as I am related to, and differentiated from others in that same social world via that world's distinctions, institutions, social practices, and so forth. But this self-understanding is not constructed out of relations with just any others and institutions, nor is it

constructed out of relations with all others universally. It is rather, constructed through relations with the particular others that one encounters in their existence in one's immediate world (or immediate set of worlds as the case may be). Here is where we can begin to see the critique of the idea of a universal love.

De Beauvoir points out that if politics requires a public (universalist) notion of love, that is:

If all men are my brothers, no particular man is my brother any longer.

Multiplying the ties that bind me to the world by infinity is a way of denying those that unite me to this singular minute, to this singular corner of the earth...All figures disappear; they are reduced to the universal ground whose presence cannot be distinguished from absolute absence.³⁵

In other words, if political action requires the kind of abstract love of all that its proponents suggest it should, then individuals are left with no one to be. I can no longer make sense of myself and my commitments via my relations with others (both positive and negative) because the others to which I am related are far too diffuse, to spread out, too universal. I need some others to show me precisely who and what I am not, in order to recognize who and what I am so that my projects (political and otherwise) are able to be oriented. I need to recognize myself as one who is opposed to racist police violence, or the xenophobic state, or patriarchy and who is one who is willing to fight those things alongside others who are willing to fight those things. As Beauvoir argues, "solidarities are created, but a man cannot enter into solidarity with all others...one will always work for certain men against others."³⁶ Now this is not to say that some kind of love has no place in politics as we

have seen above, I can come to feel love for some whom I struggle alongside, and for the movement itself via the emotional work we engage in together, but this is not a requirement. What is a requirement is the recognition afforded by the working together in solidarity. As Beauvoir points out, in order for individuals to come to see each other as equals and comrades in political struggle (and hence, to come to be able to love one another) they in fact must live together and work together:

I can concretely appeal only to the men who exist for me, and they exist for me only if I have created ties with them, or if I have made them into my neighbors. They exist as allies or as enemies according to whether my project agrees with theirs or contradicts it.³⁷

It is out of this kind of laborious closeness that a politics of solidarity serves as a better foundation than a politics of universal love. In such activity in solidarity, individuals can, in a quasi-Hegelian sense, come to know and respect one another. That is, individuals can come to recognize themselves in and alongside one another. They can engage in work together in ways that produce and transform affective states and emotions, through the habituation afforded in movement building. It is this process that makes both solidarity and love possible. To be sure, neither is this a universalist solidarity, nor is this a universalist love but rather a particular solidarity among a particular set of individuals whom come together for a common goal and through the labor of struggling together, become able to exist in reciprocal recognition of—and solidarity with—one another. What Beauvoir shows us is not only that I need not love others in order to work alongside them, come to respect them as comrades on political struggle but that it is only in my relations with

particular others (in solidarity with some, and opposed to others) that I am able to make sense of who I am and also make sense of my world.

To be sure, it is more than possible that love can emerge in the midst of political movements and political struggle, and we should not condemn it when it does. Love's emergence in this way marks a transformation of affect via habituation and the power of the emotional work of a given political movement, nevertheless love is not necessary to ground political struggle, only solidarity is. In returning to the contemporary struggles in the U.S. then, it may be true for some that ultimately 'love trumps hate' as many of the signs we see at political rallies proclaim (using word play to call out the hatred for women, immigrants, and minorities that is on display in the Trump administration), but this should not be our foundational claim. Our foundational call should be a call for solidarity with the hope that love emerges in struggle and through the emotional work of the movement.

¹ Keeayanga-Yamahtta Taylor, "No Time For Despair," *Jacobin Magazine*, January 28, 2017, accessed Feb 15, 2017 <https://www.jacobinmag.com/2017/01/trump-black-lives-racism-sexism-anti-inauguration/>

² Asad Haider, "When the Cry Rings Out," *Viewpoint Magazine*, January 30 2017, accessed February 15th, 2017 <https://viewpointmag.com/2017/01/30/when-the-cry-rings-out/>

³ Sally Sholz, "Political Solidarity and Violent Resistance" in *The Journal of Social Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring 2007) 38-52.

⁴ Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution*, (New York and London: Penguin, 1965) 86-89.

⁵ Eric Foner "Struggle and Progress: Eric Foner on the Abolitionist Movement, Reconstruction, and Winning "Freedom" From the Right" in *Jacobin Magazine* Issue 18 (summer 2015).

⁶ See Badiou, Alain *In Praise of Love*, trans. Peter Bush (London: Serpent's Tail Books, 2012) and Slavoj Žižek *The Fragile Absolute: Or Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?* (London and New York: Verso, 2009).

⁷ See Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, translated by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003)

⁸ Erich Fromm, *The Art of Loving* (New York: Harper and Row: 1956) 56

⁹ There is no doubt that people make claims about loving others without, say, respecting them, or knowing them very well, etc., but a true kind of love requires these further attributes.

¹⁰ Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute*. 100

¹¹ Ibid,

¹² Fromm, *The Art of Loving*. 48

¹³ Hardt, Michael and Toni Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: Penguin, 2004) 351.

¹⁴ Ibid., 100

¹⁵ Ibid., 103

¹⁶ Ibid., 99-100

¹⁷ Ibid., 348-350

¹⁸ Mark Malloy, "Palestinians Tweet Tear Gas Advice to Protestors in Ferguson" Telegraph UK, August 15, 2014, accessed February 20, 2017

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11036190/Palestinians-tweet-tear-gas-advice-to-protesters-in-Ferguson.html>

¹⁹ Kristian Davis Bailey, "Dream Defenders, Black Lives Matter & Ferguson Reps Take Historic Trip to Palestine" January 9, 2016, accessed Feb 20 2017.

<http://www.ebony.com/news-views/dream-defenders-black-lives-matter-ferguson-reps-take-historic-trip-to-palestine#axzz4afSIFrVS>

²⁰ Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 351

²¹ Ibid

²² Deborah Gould, *Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight Against Aids* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009)

²³ Ibid., 29

²⁴ Ibid., 229-232

²⁵ Ibid., 233

²⁶ Maria Lugones, "Playfulness, 'World'-travelling and Loving Perception" in *Hypatia* Vol 2, No. 2 (Summer, 1987) 3-19.

²⁷ Ibid., 9.

²⁸ Ibid., 12.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Sarah Ahmed, "Happy Objects" in Melissa Gregg and Gregory j. Seigworth eds. *The Affect Theory Reader* (Durham and London: Duke UP, 2010) 35

³¹ Ibid., 32

³² This is, of course, not the claim that Haider makes in his piece, I just call attention to it here to help make the point.

³³ Simone De Beauvoir, "Pyrrhus and Cineas" in *Simone De Beauvoir: Philosophical writings*. Edited by Margaret Simons (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2004).

³⁴ Ibid., 108

³⁵ De Beauvoir 101

³⁶ Ibid., 108.

³⁷ Ibid., 135.

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